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UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CONDITIONS

MAURICE H. MERRILL

Dictum, oft repeated, tends to crystallize into a role of
law. A rule, so crystallized, is given judicial application, often
without detailed consideration of its foundations or proper limits. A time comes when able and ingenious counsel, zealous for
the cause in which they are retained, seek to extend the application of the rule far beyond the limits of the sphere within which
it arose. The use of familiar phraseology may lead the court
to acquiesce, seemingly at least, without adequate investigation
of the basis for the new extension or of possible conflicts with
other well-established lines of decision. In this manner, imperceptibly and without arousing attention at the time, decisions and
dicta at variance with doctrines long regarded as established find
place in the fabric of the law.' When this occurs, it is necessary
to work out in some. fashion a reconciliation of the old and
the new lines of decision, or, if this attempt fails, to determine
which deserves to survive. Such a situation seems to have arisen
in connection with the recent development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The genesis and the early development of the doctrine have
been dealt with adequately and in great detail elsewhere. 2 Here
it is necessary to give only such a summary as may be requisite
to an adequate presentation of the problem to be discussed. The
story begins with the efforts put forth by many states to prevent
foreign corporations doing business within their boundaries from
resorting to the federal courts. The orthodox American doctrine

I Mr. Charles Warren has given us an excellent account of such a process in
another field of constitutional law. See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment (i926) 3p Hv. L. REV. 431, to which Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655 (1927), affords an interesting sequel. See also
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 371, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 646 (1927).
'See HENDERSON, THE PosITIoN OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AmAtIcAN
CONSTITUIONAL LAW (1918)

c. 8.
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that the right of a foreign corporation to transact business within
the boundaries of a state depends entirely upon the state's permission 3 seemed to offer a means of accomplishing the desired
result. If the states had power to refuse admittance to foreign
corporations entirely, with or without cause, surely they might
4
exact in return for admission whatever boon they wished.

If

so, a promise, prior to admission, not to resort to the federal
courts, or a liability to expulsion in case of such a resort, required
as the price of admission, would seem to be a legitimate and effective means of attaining the desired end.5 The states were not
slow to try out this method. Naturally the corporations resisted,
and in the case of Insurance Co. v. Morse 6 the Supreme Court
of the United States held void a statute requiring an agreement
not to remove suits to the federal courts as a condition precedent
to admission. This decision was based upon the ground, supported by dicta expressed in two earlier cases, 7 that the exaction
of the agreement was an attempt to interfere with the exercise of
a right derived from the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. While the term "unconstitutional condition" was not
specifically employed in the opinion, the case seems clearly to be
the fountainhead of the doctrine which now goes by that name.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. i68 (U. S. 1868).

assumes the usual exceptions to the rule.

Of course, the statement

See BURDICK, THE LAW

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) 484.
'Cf. HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 133.
5 See argument of counsel for the defendant

OF THE

in error in Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 447 (U. S. 1874), and the dissenting opinion of Waite,
C. J., at 458.
'Supra note 5. Accord: Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. i86, 7 Sup. Ct. 931
(1887).
"A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with
the consent, express or implied, of the latter State, 13 Pet. 519. This consent
may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and
these conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other states, and by this
court, provided they are not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United
States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for
defence." Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, i8 How. 404, 407 (U. S. 1855).
"The power of the State to discriminate between her own domestic corporations and those of other States, desirous of transacting business within her
jurisdiction, is clearly established. . . . As to the nature or degree of discrimination, it belongs to the State to determine, subject only to such limitations on
her sovereignty as may be found in the fundamental law of the Union." Ducat
v. Chicago,

io Wall.

410, 415 (U. S. i87o).
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After some vacillation, and after attempts at distinction between requiring an agreement not to resort to the federal courts
as a condition precedent to admission and ouster after admission
for resorting to such courts, s and between corporations engaged
solely in intrastate commerce and those engaged in both interstate
and intrastate business, 9 it has been definitely decided within the
last decade that neither directly nor indirectly may the state condition its grant of entry to the foreign corporation upon the forbearance of the latter to resort to the national courts. 10 The
actual decisions in these cases do not involve any sweeping denial of state power to require a surrender of constitutional privilege in return for favors granted. They merely forbid the states
to condition their grants upon agreement not to resort to the federal courts. The use of state bargaining power to discourage or
to restrict recourse to the federal tribunals might well be considered so inconsistent with the efficient functioning of the governmental system set up by the Constitution of the United States
as to be forbidden by that document." A similar explanation
may be made of many other decisions in which the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been invoked. Thus states have
been forbidden to condition the entry of foreign corporations
upon assent to taxes, or to other conditions which burden interstate commerce,' 12 or upon submission to regulation of conduct
'Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1876) ; Security Mut. L, Ins.
Co. v, Prewitt, 2o2 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. 61g (igoi).
'Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 232 U. S.318, 34 Sup. Ct. 333 (1913);

ef. Donald v. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co., 241 U. S. 329, 36 Sup. Ct. 563
(1916).
" Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (1922).
'See HENDERSON, op. cit, supra note 2, at 141, 142, for a fuller exposition

of this view.

'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. i9o (91o)
(tax) ; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232 (1910) (tax) ;
Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146, 30 Sup. Ct. 2o (1910)
(tax) ; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S.178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85 (917) (tax); Sioux
Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57 (914)
(payment of license
fee and appointment of resident service agent as condition to suing in state court
to enforce interstate contract); Dahnke-Walker Mill. Co. v. Bondurant, 257
U. S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. io6 (1921) (same); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster,
247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438 (1918) (regulation of interstate commerce in
return for use of streets) ; International Paper Co. v. Mass., 246 U. S. 135, 38
Sup. Ct. 292 (1918) (tax).
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outside the state, 3 or upon allowing the state to tax property
situated beyond its borders. 1 4 The free conduct of interstate
commerce, liberty of access to the national courts, freedom of the
states from forays by each other into their respective territorial
domains over conduct and taxation, are bound up with the working of the division of powers among the states and between the
states and the central government. The use of state power to interfere with this apportionment, even by way of bargaining, seems
properly to be held beyond the pale of the Constitution. But such
a view is by no means inconsistent with permitting the exchange
of favors in return for a surrender of constitutional privileges
not bound up with the working of our system of divided governmental functions.
The language advanced in support of the decisions does not,
however, limit the doctrine to the preservation of the federal system against state encroachment. On the contrary, broad terms
have been used from the beginning, indicative of a view that the
doctrine may be employed by foreign corporations to oppose attempts to force the waiver of any constitutional privilege, whatever its character, as the price of admission. As we have seen,
the dicta upon which the first decision was based excepted all
conditions "repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United
States" from the states' bargaining power,' 5 and that case itself
contains language equally broad in its significance. 16 Later pronouncements were still more sweeping. 17 The prophecy of the
'Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 27o U. S. 426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331 (1926).
"' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, supra note 12; Looney v. Crane Co.,
supra note 12.
15See

extracts set out supra note 7.
""None of the cases so much as intimate that conditions may be imposed
which are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority
of each State from encroachment by others." Insurance Co. v. Morse, supra
note 5, at 457.
"7 "As the Iowa statute makes the right to a permit dependent upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, the statute requiring the permit must be held to
be void." • Barron v. Burnside, supra note 6, at 200, 7 Sup. Ct. at 936.
"But that statute, requiring the corporation, as a condition precedent to
obtaining a permit to do business within the State, to surrender a right and
privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States, was
unconstitutional and void. . . ." Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202,
207, 13 Sup. Ct. 44, 46

(1892).
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doctrine's expanded scope contained in these pronouncements
seems fulfilled by recent decisions forbidding the states to barter
admission to foreign corporations in return for the surrender of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' a
provision which it is impossible to regard as related in any respect
to the proper operation of the federal system.
It has been suggested that the result of forbidding the states
to exact a relinquishment of any constitutional privilege in return
for admission is to establish the abandonment of "the traditional
doctrine that a foreign corporation can be excluded at the will of
the state." 19 Certainly such cases as Kentucky Finance Corp. v.
ParamountAuto Exchange Corp.20 go far to suggest such a result, and force us to admit a seeming merit in the contention that,
when one cannot legally exact the price he pleases in return for
the grant of a privilege, that privilege is no longer within his control. 21 But, however logical such a deduction from the cases may

appear, it quite evidently does not accord with the conception of
.the doctrine entertained by the Supreme Court. In none of the
cases is there a general denial of the power to exclude, and the
the requirement

. . . compelled the company, in order that it

* might do local business . . . to waive its constitutional exemption from state
taxation on its interstate business and on its property outside of the State . . .
the State could no more exact such a waiver than it could prescribe as a condition
of the company's right to do local business in Kansas that it agree to waive the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, or the guaranty
against being deprived of its property otherwise than by due process of law."
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, spra note 12, at 62, 3o Sup. Ct. at 234.
"For example, a state may not say to a foreign corporation, you may do
business within our borders if you permit your property to be taken without due
process of law, or you may transact business in interstate commerce subject to
the regulatory power of the state." Baltic Min. Co. v. Mass., 231 U. S. 68, 83,
34 Sup. Ct. i5, i8 (1913).
'Air-Way E. A. Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (1924) (tax
statute); Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926)
(same); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 47 Sup. Ct. 67,8 (927)
(venue statute) ; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pa., 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553
(1928)

(tax statute).

See

HENDERSON, op. Cit. supra note 2, at r47.
= 262 U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636 (r923), holding that a foreign corporation
could not be prevented from coming into a state to assert its title to property
situated therein by suit in the state courts and that, on such entry, the foreign
corporation became a person within the state's jurisdiction and therefore entitled
to "the equal protection of the laws."
'See HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 147. In (1928) x6 CALIF. L.
REv. 428, 431, it is stated that: "The waiver of a right can not be attached to
the commission of an act which the state has no power to prevent."
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recent decisions of the Court indicate that it continues to regard
entry into a state by a foreign corporation as a privilege which
the state may deny or may grant upon condition, provided the
condition does not fall within the class described as "unconstitutional." 22 At the most, this interpretation of the cases repre-'
sents a position that may be taken in the future; it does not appear to constitute the law of today.
LIMITS OF THE MODERN EXTENSION

If the doctrine be viewed as affording protection against the
"trading off" of constitutional privileges, it seems logical to inquire why it should be restricted to grants of admission, or why
foreign corporations alone should be regarded as entitled to its
protection. If the protection of the Constitution be too precious
to be bartered away by foreign corporations, is it not equally
so with respect to domestic corporations, and still more with respect to the individual? And if constitutional privileges may
not be bargained away in return for the privilege of doing business within the state, is there any other favor or benefit within
the control of the state for which they may be exchanged? Logic
seems to indicate a negative answer. We should, therefore, expect to find that astute counsel would argue for such a widened
application of the doctrine, and we should not be too surprised
if their argument be regarded as meritorious by the Court.
This point in the extension of the unconstitutional condition doctrine appears to have been reached in Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. 23

In that case was involved

the validity of a statute of California requiring a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to be secured by carriers, whether
common or private, as a prerequisite to carrying on their business over the public highways of the state. The act was interpreted by the Supreme Court as imposing upon the applicant the
obligation to assume the duties and liabilities of a common car'E. g. Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert,

239

U. S. 560, 36 Sup. Ct. 168

(1916) ; Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U. S. 499, 40 Sup. Ct. 365 (1920) ;
Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 124 (927) ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 48 Sup. Ct. 577 (1928).
=271

U. S. 583,46 Sup. Ct. 6o5 (1926).
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rier as a condition precedent to the issuance of the certificate. It
held the statute, so construed, unconstitutional, primarily on the
ground that to force the status of a common carrier upon a private carrier against his will amounts to deprivation of property
without due process of law.2-

To the suggestion that, as the

state might deny the use of its highways altogether to carriers, 25
it might make its permission conditional upon assumption of the
public utility status, the Court responded that to do so would be
using the power of refusal to reach a forbidden result, and hence
would itself be unconstitutional.
The case has been criticized with apparent soundness on the
ground that the requirement of the certificate was separable from
the remainder of the act, making it unnecessary to consider the
attempted imposition of common carrier duties, 20 but this criticism in no way detracts from the significance of the Court's position. The six justices forming the majority of the Court may
have mistaken the question before them, but there is no doubt
as to their solution of the question that they thought was before
them. Upon that point the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the majority, is significant:
"It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as
a general rule, the state, having power to deny as a privilege
altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit
to impose; but the power of the state in that respect is not
unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may,
in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence." 27
This is surely an unequivocal adoption of the view that all
privileges vouchsafed by the Federal Constitution are beyond the
" See Michigan P. U. Comm. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 577, 45 Sup. Ct, I9I,
193 (1925).

"This was assumed for the purposes of the case. Supra note 23, at
46 Sup. Ct. at 607.
"'See (1926) 40 HARv. L. Rnv. 131; (1927) iI MiNN. L. Rnv. 555.
7Sipra
note 23, at 593, 46 Suip. Ct. at 6o7.

592,
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bargaining power of the state. It squarely declares that, though
the state may have privileges within its control which it may withhold at will, it cannot use a grant of those privileges to secure a
valid consent to acts which, if imposed upon the grantee in
invitum, would be beyond its constitutional power. Whether the
grantee is a natural or an artificial person is entirely immaterial.
Equally without significance is the nature of the constitutional
privilege affected by the prescribed action.
But when given this broad scope the doctrine enunciated in
the Frost case runs squarely afoul of numerous lines of decision.
Although there are dicta in three cases which seem to foreshadow
it,2 8 the decision in the Frostcase, in addition to marking the first

application of the unconstitutional condition doctrine to the protection of all constitutional privileges, actually conflicts with such
a well-established current of adjudication that it is difficult to see
how both can survive in the body of our constitutional law.
The cases holding that a domestic corporation may not question the validity of provisions of the law under which it is incorporated may perhaps be distinguished upon the ground that the
creature may not question the creative act.29 Yet, since domestic

corporations are entitled to the protection of the Constitution,3 0
it seems that they should be in as strong a position to disavow a
waiver of constitutional privileges when exacted as the price of
their corporate existence as when made in return for the grant
of any other favor.3 1 Hence it seems entirely proper to regard
' See W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minn., 18o U. S. 452, 468, 21 Sup. Ct. 423, 429
(igoi) ; Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 117, 37 Sup. Ct. 58,
6o (1916) ; Board of Pub. Util. Com'rs v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U. S. 4O, 404,
40 Sup. Ct. 277, 278 (1920).
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582, 22 Sup. Ct. 229 (1902)
(railroad may not question provision of incorporation imposing absolute liability
for injury to passengers) ; Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Mass., 207 U. S. 79, 28
Sup. Ct. 26 (907) (corporation may not question validity of rate-fixing provision in its charter) ; International & G. N. Ry. v. Anderson County, 246 U. S.
424, 38 Sup. Ct. 370 (1918) (provision in charter relative to removal of railroad
shops and offices); see Roberts & Schaeffer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50, 54,
46 Sup. Ct. 375, 376 (1926) (domestic corporation franchise tax a§ denying
equal protection).
'Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 17
Sup. Ct. 198 (1896).
' See suggestion to this effect by Holmes, J., in Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v.
Mass., supra note 29, at 85, 28 Sup. Ct. at 27. See also Day, J., in Kansas City,
M. & B. R. R. v. Stiles, supra note 28, at 117, 37 Sup. Ct. at 6o.
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these cases as in conflict with the principles enunciated in the
Frost case.
In other decisions we find still more clear-cut opposition to
the broadened doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. A state
may exact as a condition to the admission of a foreign corporation that it abide by the state's anti-trust laws, irrespective of the
question whether those laws arbitrarily restrain freedom of contract in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The same
is true of regulations affecting the making of insurance contracts.33 Congress may require relinquishment by the grantee of
claims to other land as a condition to a land grant, although the
grantee has acquired "vested rights" to such land not subject to
destruction by Congress without the grantee's consent.34 In return for the grant to a pipe line, built to convey oil to a particular
refinery, of the power of eminent domain and the right to transport oil, the state may require it to assume the obligations of a
common carrier, 35 a result that seems almost squarely in conflict
with the Frost decision. The benefits of an elective workmen's
compensation act may be bartered for a surrender of the right
to due process in judicial teview of the decisions of an administrative tribunal.3 ( A riparian owner, having by the local law no
right to erect a dam without the state's consent, may be required,
in return for such consent, to agree to future acquisition by the
state of the dam site, flowage rights, and property used in connection therewith at a valuation below that to which he would be
constitutionally entitled upon a compulsory taking.87 So the withholding of franchise privileges which a city has within its control
may be used as an inducement to the sale of property at a reduced
'Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v,Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518 (igoo).
"Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, i81 U. S. 73, 2r Sup. Ct. 535

(igox).

".Humbird v. -Avery, 195 U. S. 480, 25 Sup. Ct. 123 (904).
'Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Ref. Co., 259 U. S. 125, 42 Sup. Ct, 440
(1922) ; see Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 561, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 958 (sprg).
cBooth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm., 271 U. S. 208, 46 Sup. Ct. 491
; cf. Oceanic St. Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 32o, 29 Sup. Ct. 671

(1926)

(i909) (in the realm of federal power).
"Fox River Paper Co. v, Railroad Comm., 274 U. S. 65i, 47 Sup. Ct. 669
(1927).
"Compliance with g 31,09 is the price which plaintiffs must pay to
secure the right to maintain their dam." Ibid. 657, 47 Sup. Ct. at 671.
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price.'- And there are numerous cases holding that public utilities may, in return for franchise grants, contract away their right
to a "non-confiscatory" rate under the Fourteenth Arriendment. 39
All these cases seem irreconcilably opposed to the doctrine of
the Frost case. In all of them the privilege waived was one whichthe Court held protected by the Constitution against enforced
deprivation. In all of them, the waiver was made in return for
the grant by the state of some benefit which it was privileged to
give or to withhold. It seems incontrovertible that if the doctrine of the Frost case is to stand these cases must fall. That the
overthrow of this line of decision was not contemplated by the
Supreme Court appears evident from the fact that the list contains cases practically contemporaneous- with, and even subsequent
to, the Frost case. In such a state of the authorities it is proper
to consider the arguments favoring each of the competing doctrines in order to determine which is worthy of survival.
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTING FORCES

The argument in favor of the broad application of the unconstitutional condition rule is the familiar policy against accomplishing a forbidden result by indirection. If the state may not
enforce its will upon these matters without the consent of those
affected, may it grant or withhold favors as a means of extorting
a consent which would not be given freely without such pressure? Is there not a danger that the guarantees of the Constitution may be completely destroyed under the guise of a fictitious
assent given because of the pressure exerted by the state? It is
vigorously put by Mr. justice Sutherland in the following extract
from the opinion in the Frost case:
'City
and County of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 33
Sup. Ct. 657 (913) ; Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 255 U. S. 171, 41
Sup. Ct. 285 (1921).
Columbus Ry. P. & L. Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct.
349 (I919) ; Georgia Ry. & P. Co. v. Town of Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 43 Sup.
Ct. 613 (1923); City of Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co., 265 U. S. 215, 44 Sup.
Ct. 517 (1924); St. Cloud Pub. Ser. Co. v. City of St. Cloud, 265 U. S. 352,
44 Sup. Ct. 492 (1924) ; Southern Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 268 U. S.
232, 45 Sup. Ct. 488 (1925) ; Henderson Water Co. v. Corp. Comm., 269 U. S.
278, 46 Sup. Ct. 112 (1925). The same principle appears to be applied in Grand
Rapids & Indiana Ry. v. Osborn, 193 U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 310 (1904).
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"There is involved in the inquiry not a single power,
but two distinct powers. One of these, the power to prohibit the use of the public highways in proper cases, the state
possesses; and the other, the power to compel a private carrier to assume against his will the duties and burdens of a
common carrier, the state does not possess. It is clear that
any attempt to exert the latter, separately and substantively,
must fall before the paramount authority of the Constitution. May it stand in the conditional form in which it is
here made? If so, constitutional guaranties, so carefully
safeguarded against direct assault, are open to destruction
by the indirect, but no less effective, process of requiring a
surrender, which, though in form voluntary, in fact lacks
none of the elements of compulsion. Having regard to form
alone, the act here is an offer to the private carrier of a privilege, which the state may grant or deny, upon a condition
which the carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the
carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock
and the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which
may be vital to his livelihood or submit to a requirement
which may constitute an intolerable burden." 40
The doctrine of the Frost case thus viewed becomes a barrier against subversive attacks by the government, state or federal, upon the privileges vouchsafed by the Constitution. Its justification lies in the feeling that it is hard bargaining for the state
to exact a surrender of those privileges in return for a grant of
41
favor.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the effect
of the doctrine, if fully established and extended to. its logical
boundaries, will be seriously to curtail the power of the states in
advancing policies that are deemed socially desirable. If the Constitution stands in the way of the imposition of such a policy in
0
Supra note 23, at 593, 46 Sup. Ct. at 607. See also the extract quoted
supra p.
. Day, J., in Baltic Min.Co. v. Mass., supra note 17, at 83, 34 Sup.
Ct. at 18 (pi93), said: "For example, a state may not say to a foreign corporation, you may do business within our borders if you permit your property to
be taken without due process of law, or you may transact business in interstate
commerce subject to the regulatory power of the state. To allow a state to
exercise such authority would permit it to deprive of fundamental right those
entitled to have the protection of the Constitution in every part of the Union."
"*For comment favoring this view see Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Power (1927) 26 MIcH. L. Rav. 176.
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invitin, it seems perfectly logical for the state to buy assent
thereto and to utilize as payment whatever of value may be within
its control. The ever-increasing complexity of our social life, the
resultant problems in the adjustment of conflicting interests, call
for state interference to secure solutions deemed desirable in a
constantly growing progression. The frequency with which limitations flowing from broad constitutional °phrases are found to
stand in the way of such solutions is attested by the reported decisions. The extent to which the bargaining power has been useful in overcoming such blockades is shown by the decisions already enumerated in which its use was affirmed. That it 'will be
found of still greater usefulness in the future is beyond doubt.
It seems particularly serviceable as a means of escape from blind
alleys created by decisions under the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 42 and other constitutional
provisions counched in general terms. That every decision rendered under language of such broad vagueness as is contained
in these clauses should represent a desirable permanent restriction upon governmental power is impossible. Yet amendment
of the Constitution to overcome specific decisions is impracticable,
and the process of correction through overruling and distinguishing past cases is slow and uncertain. The most effective way of
dealing with such situations is through the bargaining power. To
destroy this avenue of escape seems highly undesirable. That
it involves the use of some pressure to waive constitutional privileges seems no insuperable objection so long as the pressure
merely assumes the form of withholding that which the state is
under no obligation to grant. As Mr. Justice Holmes aptly remarks:
"In order to enter into most of the relations of life
people have to give up some of their constitutional rights.
If a man makes a contract he gives up the constitutional right
42 While the decisions so far confine the application of the doctrine to state
bargaining power, there is no reason to anticipate that federal immunity therefrom will continue if its wider application becomes established. Logically there
is no reason for such a distinction. Surely a sale of constitutional privileges to
the national government is no less reprehensible than a similar sale to a state.
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that previously he had
43 to be free from the hamper that he
puts upon himself."
So long as the surrender is freely made, without undue pressure, the law regards it as proper. The withholding of favors
within one's control is not considered undue pressure. That the
bargainer is the government should make no difference in this
respect.
The undesirability of limiting state bargaining power by the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may be made more apparent by consideration of contemporary social problems to the
solution of which the bargaining power appears to offer an effective tool. One example may be found in "the valuation war" 44
in the field of public utilities in which the Supreme Court seems
more and more to tend toward "reproduction cost" as the measure
of the rate base required by due process. 45 In Massachusetts, we
are told, it is proposed to place the "prudent investment" standard
upon a legally unexceptionable foundation by bartering therefor
46
the power of eminent domain and authority to issue securities.
Ribnik v. McBride 47 and similar cases 41 suggest another example. If a state finds itself cut off from rate regulation in a field
which its policy deems ripe therefor, may it not exchange for
consent to such regulation the monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
position afforded to the holder of a certificate of public necessity
and convenience? The Frost case apparently would deny this,
although an older authority strongly implies the propriety of such
procedure. 49 In the field of self-incrimination, state courts have
sustained the requirement of reports from participants in auto' Dissenting in Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, supra note x8, at 497, 47
Sup. Ct. at 681.
"See Robinson, Duty of a Public Utility to Serve at Reasonable Rates: The
"Valuation" War (i928) 6 N. C. L. REV. 243; Guernsey, Value in Confiication
Cases (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REay. 575.
' McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144

(z926).

" See Robinson, supra note 44, at 271.
'T277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928).
"Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (927);

Standard Oil Co., 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (I929).
"See Slaughter-House Cases, I6 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).
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mobile accidents upon the state's power to demand assent thereto
in return for the privilege of using motor cars upon the highways. 50 If the doctrine under discussion spreads to the state
courts (and there is no reason why it should not, if federal sanction continues therefor) these decisions seem to be in danger.
And one is tempted to speculate concerning the effect upon public
business of a thoroughly consistent application of. the doctrine.
May the government enforce a favorable bargain for the purchase of goods after prices have rise? Has not the vendor been
forced to barter his constitutional right to just compensation for
the goods in return for the government's promise to take them?
Whether one agrees with the desirability of finding a way
to escape from any particular situation mentioned as an illustration is beside the point. The important thing is that there are
many social problems of which solutions, deemed desirable by
the sentiment which finds expression in legislation, are blocked
by judicial interpretation of broad constitutional language. One
does not burn down the house to destroy a den of mice. So, a
purchase of the power to deal with the specific situation seems to
be a much more sensible, as well as practical, way out of such an
impasse than the repeal of the entire constitutional provision. To
such procedure, sanctioned by past decisions, the widened application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions offers a serious
threat. In what way may the threatened danger to an important
weapon of social control be averted?
VALIDITY OF THE CONDITION DETERMINED BY PURPOSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTEE

It seems that a distinction may be drawn between two classes
of constitutional privileges. 5 ' The first class includes those that
are bound up with the working of our system of federal government; such as the right of the individual to resort to the appropriate governmental agency, state or federal, for the enforcement
of his claims; or the freedom of either state or nation from en' People v. Rosenheimer, 2o9 N. Y. 15, 102 N. IE. 53o (1913); State v.
Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 At. 482 (ii6).
The suggestion, though with a different application, may be found in
HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 141, 142.
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croachment by the other upon matters within the control of one,
and the right of the individual to insist upon that freedom in an
appropriate case; or again, the freedom of the states from attempted exercise of extra-territorial powers by each other. Here
the doctrine originated, as we have seen, and here it seems to haVe
a legitimate application. Since the operation of the governmental
system set up by the Constitution, with its division of power
among the several units, is involved, it seems clear that the individual should not be permitted to barter it away. The general
interest in the proper working of the constitutional machine precludes this.
The second class includes those constitutional guarantees set
up primarily for the benefit of the individual, such as the guarantee against deprivation of life, liberty and property without
due process of law, the guarantee of the equal protection of the
laws and the guarantee of just compensation for property taken
for public use. Here the constitutional limitation is imposed for
the protection of the individual. If, for a benefit deemed satisfactory to himself, he be willing to give up the protection which
it affords, there is no general interest which demands that he retain it. In fact our whole social order rests upon the presupposition that in dealing with his fellows and with private organizations he will bargain away his constitutional immunities, and that
those bargains will be given legal effect. There seems to be no reason to exclude governmental organizations from ihe list of those
with whom he may bargain, and, as already pointed out, there
are grave considerations of public policy in favor of including
them. It would certainly seem that the unconstitutional condition doctrine should not be extended to this class of guarantees,
and that, accordingly, the Frost case should not be followed in
the future.
This does not mean a complete abandonment of these constitutional guarantees to whatever pressure government may
bring to compel their surrender. Here, as in the field of private
agreenient, consent must be freely given. Duress, destroying the
will, fettering freedom of action, vitiates consent. This principle
is well illustrated by Union Pacific R. R. v. Public Comm. of
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2
Missouri,1

which held that consent to an unconstitutional tax

upon a bond issue was not shown by the property owner's application for approval of the issue, not to be obtained without payment of the tax, where the approval was a prerequisite to the
marketability of the bonds, the transaction involved refinancing
of an important railroad system, and the property covered by the
mortgage was of an extensive and permanent character. There
the pressure brought to bear by the state was of so severe a nature, involving the destruction or serious hampering of an established business, not readily convertible into cash, that it amounted
to duress, vitiating the formal consent to the application. It is
possible that a similar explanation may be made of the Frost
case. There was involved what appears to have been an established investment in the business and certain of the language of
the court indicates that considerations akin to duress may have
influenced the decision.5 3 If so, it should have been placed upon
that ground. It is not clear, however, that the case is properly
one of duress. There seem to have been no property values involved that might not have been salvaged on retirement from the
business, and ordinarily mere denial by the state of the opportunity to engage in lucrative trade does not constitute duress. 5 4 In
any event, as duress is personal, in such a case the invalidity would
be only as to those whose investment antedated the act. The
decision goes too far in holding the law completely void, if its
basis is that of duress.
If the views herein suggested be adopted, the decisions extending protection to foreign corporations against surrender of
any constitutional privilege in return for admission to do business may be upheld on the theory that free commercial use of
the corporate form of organization necessitates the abandonment
of the old doctrine of exclusion. Otherwise it may be necessary
5248

U. S. 67, 39 Sup. Ct. 24 (I9x8) ; cf. Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S.

17, 40 Sup. Ct. 419 (1920).

"Having regard to form alone, the act here is an offer to the private carrier of a privilege which the carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the
carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpoolan option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit to
a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden." Supra note 23, at
593, 46 Sup. Ct. at 6o7.
" Cable v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 24 Sup. Ct. 74 (1903).
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to overrule those decisions.

It is not conceived, however, that

the consequences of such a retrocession would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the considerations in favor of maintaining
the principle behind the numerous cases which uphold the bargaining power. As the cases now stand, the sole effect would ble
the overthrow of several decisions protecting foreign corporations
from buying admission by the surrender of equal protection in
taxation and procedure." All are comparatively recent and the
great expansion of corporate enterprise throughout the country
suggests that the absence of judicial relief of this nature in past
years has not retarded proper commercial development. There
should be no hesitation on this score to return to the position
marked out alike by the past decisions and by the proper scope
of constitutional provisions in favor of the individual.5 6 The
Supreme Court has been free to correct its position in the past,
either through direct recession from an untenable position or
through modification and limitation.57 The present status of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions appears clearly to afford
an appropriate occasion for further exercise of this attribute of
judicial statesmanship.
See list of cases supra note IS.
"Some rights, no doubt, a person is not allowed to renounce, but very many
he may." Holmes, J., dissenting in Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, supra note IS,
at 497, 47 Sup. Ct. at 68o.
" See Mr. Justice Brandeis' lists of examples of modified or overruled doctrines in Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 238, 44 Sup. Ct.
302, 309 (1924), and in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 43, 47 Sup. Ct.
267, 270 (1927). See also, on the same topic, Willis, Soine Conflicting Decisions

of the United States Supreme Court (1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 155, 278.

